The free will in Duns Scoto

The possibility of choice

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.34024/prometeica.2024.30.16374

Keywords:

self-determination, will, freedom, choice, reason

Abstract

This work aims to delve deeper into the concept of freedom as self-determination of the will in Juan Duns Escoto. The problem of choice is interpreted from a reading of Aristotelian ethics that favors a point of view focused on the fact that what properly directs choice, understood as rational desire, is reason itself. However, the problem arises of to what extent, then, it would really be a free choice, since, when the object of desire is shown to the intellect, it could not deny it if it is rational, so the choice would be determined by one's own desire. rational nature. Not being able to go against one's own rationality, furthermore, would not be limitation but coherence. For Scotus, rather, freedom is primarily constituted by the possibility of choosing any of the opposites, and even though now of choice the will always maintains the possibility of choice. Thus, freedom is understood as self-determination of the will.

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Author Biography

  • Jean Luis Arana Alencastre, Universidad de Ciencias y Artes de América Latina

    Licenciado y Magister en filosofía por la Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú. Docente de Filosofía en la Universidad de Lima. Docente e investigador de la Universidad de Ciencias y Artes de América Latina y de la Universidad Tecnológica del Perú (UTP).  Investigador miembro de la Sociedad para el Estudio de la Filosofía Medieval (SIEPM), de la Red Latinoamericana de Filosofía Medieval (RLFM) y del grupo Scholastica Colonialis de la Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú. Ha realizado artículos en torno a la filosofía clásica, medieval y barroca. Asimismo, ha participado en distintos congresos y simposios en Perú, Argentina, Brasil, Colombia y México. Coordinador de Perú de la RLFM y Editor en Jefe de las revistas RCA de UCAL y Bitácora Journal de Toulouse Lautrec.

References

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Published

2024-07-08

Issue

Vol. 30 (2024): Prometeica - v 30 (07/2024 - 10/2024)

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Articles

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How to Cite

Arana Alencastre, J. L. (2024). The free will in Duns Scoto: The possibility of choice. Prometeica - Journal of Philosophy and Science, 30, 82-91. https://doi.org/10.34024/prometeica.2024.30.16374
Received 2024-02-25
Accepted 2024-06-09
Published 2024-07-08