Thoughts on deflationist understandings of the mind

Criticisms from the work of Amie L. Thomasson

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.34024/prometeica.2025.32.18697

Keywords:

deflationism, ontology, philosophy of mind, philosophy of language

Abstract

Semantic deflationism is a theory that has gained much strength in the last 20 years, which has led to the use of the deflationist approach in different areas of philosophy, and philosophy of mind is no exception. Now, deflationism is not a vague concept that allows referring everything and at the same time nothing, but rather, according to Amie L. Thomasson, semantic deflationism, existence deflationism and meta-ontological deflationism go hand in hand and change the way ontological debates are conducted, so that if we adopt one type of deflationism, we must commit ourselves to the others. It is for this reason that this paper will first develop the argument of the American author and then analyze whether deflationist understandings of the mind in contemporary philosophy contemplate the above-mentioned consequences.

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Author Biography

  • Vincent Vergara, Universidad Católica del Maule

    Psicólogo y Licenciado en Psicología por la Universidad Católica del Maule, Talca. Chile.

    Candidato a Doctor en Filosofía, Religión y Pensamiento Contemporáneo por la Universidad Católica del Maule, Talca. Chile.

    Tesis doctoral en desarrollo, que establece puentes entre Filosofía de la Mente, Filosofía del lenguaje y Metafísica, desde la perspectiva del deflacionismo.

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Prometeica v.32

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2025-06-01

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Vol. 32 (2025): Prometeica - v 32 (03/2025 - 12/2025)

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How to Cite

Vergara, V. (2025). Thoughts on deflationist understandings of the mind: Criticisms from the work of Amie L. Thomasson. Prometeica - Journal of Philosophy and Science, 32, e18697 (1-15). https://doi.org/10.34024/prometeica.2025.32.18697
Received 2024-05-27
Accepted 2025-05-01
Published 2025-06-01