The person as ‘device’ and the primacy of the impersonal

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.34024/prometeica.2025.32.19654

Keywords:

Roberto Esposito, biopolitics, personalism, impersonal

Abstract

The article analyzes Roberto Esposito's thesis that the person is an immunological device conceived to protect human life, but which at the same time restricts it. Although apparently conceived to safeguard the rights of every human being, its very structure makes this impossible, since it contains an element of exclusion and domination. The notion of personhood would be inseparable from a transcendent and possibly violent conception, so that instead of basing itself on rationality or on the affirmation of the “I” or the “you,” characteristic of personalism, rights and dignity would have to be sustained in the individualization proper to impersonal life or a “third person.” Nor would plurality be possible if each person were unique, because in that case it would not be possible to affirm others. The contribution will try to clarify the scope of a primacy of the impersonal and, at the same time, to question the possibility of renouncing the personal.

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Author Biography

  • Juan F. Franck, Universidad Austral

    Doctor en Filosofía por la Academia Internacional de Filosofía (Liechtenstein, 2001). Decano de Filosofía de la UNSTA (Argentina), donde dicta Lectura de Textos Filosóficos III (Filosofía Moderna), y se desempeña como investigador en el Instituto de Filosofía de la Universidad Austral (Argentina). Enseña también en la Universidad de Montevideo (Uruguay). Es autor de numerosos trabajos sobre filosofía moderna y contemporánea, y en el área interdisciplinar de la filosofía de la persona y las ciencias cognitivas.

References

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Prometeica v.32

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Published

2025-03-01

Issue

Vol. 32 (2025): Prometeica - v 32 (03/2025 - 12/2025)

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Articles - Dossier 1

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How to Cite

Franck, J. F. (2025). The person as ‘device’ and the primacy of the impersonal. Prometeica - Journal of Philosophy and Science, 32, e19654 (1-10). https://doi.org/10.34024/prometeica.2025.32.19654
Received 2024-10-29
Accepted 2024-12-26
Published 2025-03-01