The problem of freedom from the Spinozian proposal

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.34024/prometeica.2024.29.15817

Keywords:

passive emotions, active emotions, determinism, free will, agency

Abstract

In this paper, the problem of free will is addressed from a Spinozian point of view. Spinoza rejects freedom as free will. However, he considers that we can have agency (freedom) as long as, guided by the knowledge of the causes of our affections, we act in favor of our conatus. This research is divided into three chapters: In the first one, Spinoza's position on free will is briefly reconstructed; in the second one, his agency proposal is developed; finally, in the third one, it is intended to re-update Spinoza's considerations around the contemporary discussion on the problem of free will.

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Author Biography

  • Diego Alberto Rivas Diaz, Universidad Nacional de San Agustín de Arequipa

    Profesor del Departamento de Filosofía en la Universidad Nacional de San Agustín de Arequipa, Perú. Doctorando en Filosofía por la Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú. Magíster en Filosofía por la Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú con mención Sobresaliente. Licenciado en Filosofía por la Universidad Nacional de San Agustín de Arequipa. Bachiller en Filosofía, con primer puesto en todos los años cursados, por la Universidad Nacional de San Agustín de Arequipa

References

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Damasio, A. (2005). En busca de Spinoza. Neurología de las emociones y los sentimientos. Crítica.

Dennett, D. (2004). La evolución de la libertad. Paidós.

Fischer, J., Kane, R., Pereboom, D. y Vargas, M. (2007). Four Views on free will. Blackwell.

Quintanilla, P. (2019). La comprensión del otro. Fondo editorial PUCP.

Rice, L. (1977). “Emotion, appetition and conatus in Spinoza”. Revue Internationale de

philosophie. https://www.jstor.org/stable/23944184.

Spinoza, B. (1984). Ética. Sarpe.

Spinoza, B. (2000). Tratado de la reforma del entendimiento. Elaleph.

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Published

2024-03-05

Issue

Vol. 29 (2024): Prometeica - v 29 (03/2024 - 06/2024)

Section

Articles

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Copyright (c) 2024 Diego Alberto Rivas Diaz

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How to Cite

Rivas Diaz, D. A. (2024). The problem of freedom from the Spinozian proposal. Prometeica - Journal of Philosophy and Science, 29, 193-203. https://doi.org/10.34024/prometeica.2024.29.15817
Received 2023-10-20
Accepted 2024-02-13
Published 2024-03-05