Embodied artificial intelligence in science fiction

Philosophical presuppositions and implications

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.34024/prometeica.2022.Especial.13633

Keywords:

embodiment, consciousness, sci-fi, phenomenology, flesh

Abstract

In this paper, I explore the fruitful relationship between science fiction and philosophy regarding the topic of artificial intelligence. I establish a connection between certain paradigms in the philosophy of mind and consciousness and the imagination of possible future scenarios in sci-fi, especially focusing on the different ways of conceiving the role of corporeality in constituting consciousness and cognition. Then, I establish a parallelism between these different conceptions of corporeality in the philosophy of mind and certain representations of AI in sci-fi: from computers to robots and androids. I conclude by stressing the value of exchanging ideas between sci-fi and philosophy to foreshadow and evaluate some scenarios of high ethical relevance.

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Published

2022-08-11

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No. Especial (2022): Prometeica - nº Special

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How to Cite

Pace Giannotta, A. (2022). Embodied artificial intelligence in science fiction: Philosophical presuppositions and implications. Prometeica - Journal of Philosophy and Science, Especial, 21-35. https://doi.org/10.34024/prometeica.2022.Especial.13633
Received 2022-03-27
Accepted 2022-07-20
Published 2022-08-11