The theory of mental models within a non-axiomatic logic

Miguel López-Astorga

doi:10.34024/prometeica.2026.33.21454

Autores

Miguel López-Astorga University of Talca https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6004-0587

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.34024/prometeica.2026.33.21454

Palavras-chave:

sistema computacional, raciocínio humano, inferência, Non-Axiomatic Logic, teoria dos modelos mentais

Resumo

Este trabalho procura abordar a teoria dos modelos mentais a partir da Non-Axiomatic Logic (Lógica Não Axiomática). A teoria dos modelos mentais descreve os processos inferenciais naturais das pessoas e tem um forte suporte empírico. A Non-Axiomatic Logic permite construir um sistema computacional baseado nela. Portanto, se a teoria dos modelos mentais está correta e a Non-Axiomatic Logic pode representar a teoria, é possível desenvolver um sistema computacional baseado nesta última lógica que chegue a conclusões semelhantes à capacidade inferencial natural humana. Procuro demonstrar que, com vários elementos da Non-Axiomatic Logic, esta lógica pode representar processos inferenciais básicos propostos pela teoria dos modelos mentais.

6 6

Biografia do Autor

Miguel López-Astorga, University of Talca

Miguel López Astorga has a Ph.D. in Logic and Philosophy of Science from the University of Cádiz (Spain). That degree is validated by the University of Chile. His undergraduate studies were also carried out in Spain. He has a bachelor's degree in philosophy and education sciences (Philosophy section) from the University of Seville. Likewise, he has a Teaching Degree for the High School Level in Philosophy from the University of Chile (this last degree was obtained by validation of the Spanish bachelor's degree). He carried out post-doctoral research on human reasoning, on the mental model theory, and on the logical forms of propositions, under the supervision of Professor Philip Johnson-Laird.

At present, he is Full Professor and Researcher at the University of Talca (Chile). His last research focuses on both human and artificial inferential activities. He is especially interested in the relations that can be found between syntax, semantics, and pragmatics in those activities. He also addresses the possible cognitive potential of some ancient logics, particularly, Stoic logic.

Referências

Barres, P. E. & Johnson-Laird, P. N. (2003). On imagining what is true (and what is false). Thinking and Reasoning, 9(1), 1-42. https://doi.org/10.1080/13546780244000097 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/13546780244000097

Byrne, R. M. J. & Johnson-Laird, P. N. (2009). “If” and the problems of conditional reasoning. Trends in Cognitive Science, 13(7), 282-287. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2009.04.003 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2009.04.003

Espino, O. & Byrne, R. M. J. (2013). The compatibility heuristic in non-categorical hypothetical reasoning: Inferences between conditionals and disjunctions. Cognitive Psychology, 67(3), 98-129. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogpsych.2013.05.002 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogpsych.2013.05.002

Espino, O., Byrne, R. M. J., & Johnson-Laird, P. N. (2020). Possibilities and the parallel meanings of factual and counterfactual conditionals. Memory & Cognition, 48, 1263-1280. https://doi.org/10.3758/s13421-020-01040-6 DOI: https://doi.org/10.3758/s13421-020-01040-6

Johnson-Laird, P. N. (2010). Against logical form. Psychologica Belgica, 50(3/4), 193-221. http://doi.org/10.5334/pb-50-3-4-193 DOI: https://doi.org/10.5334/pb-50-3-4-193

Johnson-Laird, P. N. & Byrne, R. M. J. (2002). Conditionals: A theory of meaning, pragmatics, and inference. Psychological Review, 109(4), 646-678. https://doi.org/10.1037//0033-295X.109.4.646 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.109.4.646

Johnson-Laird, P. N., Byrne, R. M. J., & Khemlani, S. (2023). Human verifications: Computable with truth tables outside logic. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 120(40), e2310488120. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2310488120 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2310488120

Johnson-Laird, P. N., Byrne, R. M. J., & Khemlani, S. (2024). Models of possibilities instead of logic as the basis of human reasoning. Minds & Machines, 34(19). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-024-09662-4 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-024-09662-4

Johnson-Laird, P. N., Khemlani, S., & Goodwin, G. P. (2015). Logic, probability, and human reasoning. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 19(4), 201-214. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2015.02.006 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2015.02.006

Johnson-Laird, P. N. & Ragni, M. (2025). Reasoning about possibilities: Modal logics, possible worlds, and mental models. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 32(1), 52-79. https://doi.org/10.3758/s13423-024-02518-z DOI: https://doi.org/10.3758/s13423-024-02518-z

Khemlani, S., Byrne, R. M. J., & Johnson-Laird, P. N. (2018). Facts and possibilities: A model-based theory of sentential reasoning. Cognitive Science, 42(6), 1887-1924. https://doi.org/10.1111/cogs.12634 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/cogs.12634

Khemlani, S., Hinterecker, T., & Johnson-Laird, P. N. (2017). The provenance of modal inference. In G. Gunzelmann, A. Howes, T. Tenbrink, & E. J. Davelaar (Eds.), Computational Foundations of Cognition (pp. 663-668). Austin, TX: Cognitive Science Society.

Khemlani, S. & Johnson-Laird, P. N. (2009). Disjunctive illusory inferences and how to eliminate them. Memory & Cognition, 37(5), 615-623. https://doi.org/10.3758/MC.37.5.615 DOI: https://doi.org/10.3758/MC.37.5.615

Khemlani, S. & Johnson-Laird, P. N. (2022). Reasoning about properties: A computational theory. Psychological Review, 129(2), 289-312. https://doi.org/10.1037/rev0000240 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1037/rev0000240

Khemlani, S., Orenes, I., & Johnson-Laird, P. N. (2014). The negation of conjunctions, conditionals, and disjunctions. Acta Psychologica, 151, 1-7. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.actpsy.2014.05.004 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.actpsy.2014.05.004

Orenes, I. & Johnson-Laird, P. N. (2012). Logic, models, and paradoxical inferences. Mind & Language, 27(4), 357-377. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0017.2012.01448.x DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0017.2012.01448.x

Quelhas, A. C., Rasga, C., & Johnson-Laird, P. N. (2017). A priori true and false conditionals. Cognitive Science, 41(55), 1003-1030. https://doi.org/10.1111/cogs.12479 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/cogs.12479

Quelhas, A. C., Rasga, C., & Johnson-Laird, P. N. (2019). The analytic truth and falsity of disjunctions. Cognitive Science, 43(9). https://doi.org/10.1111/cogs.12739 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/cogs.12739

Ragni, M., Kola, I., & Johnson-Laird, P. N. (2018). On selecting evidence to test hypotheses: A theory of selection tasks. Psychological Bulletin, 144(8), 779-796. https://doi.org/10.1037/bul0000146 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1037/bul0000146

Wang, P. (2006). Rigid Flexibility: The Logic of Intelligence. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/1-4020-5045-3 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/1-4020-5045-3

Wang, P. (2011). The assumptions on knowledge and resources in models of rationality. International Journal of Machine Consciousness, 3(1), 193-218. https://doi.org/10.1142/S1793843011000686 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1142/S1793843011000686

Wang, P. (2013). Non-Axiomatic Logic: A Model of Intelligent Reasoning. Singapore: World Scientific. https://doi.org/10.1142/8665 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1142/8665

Wang, P. (2023). The role of copulas in reasoning. Technical Report #17. Temple AGI Team. Temple University. https://cis.temple.edu/tagit/publications/TAGIT-TR-17.pdf

A teoria dos modelos mentais dentro de uma lógica não axiomática

Autores

DOI:

Palavras-chave:

Resumo

Biografia do Autor

Referências

Downloads

Publicado

Edição

Seção

Licença

Como Citar

Prometeica

Enviar Submissão

Palavras-chave

Informações

Artigos mais recentes

Indexadores

Diretorios

Suporte

Visitas

Simbolos_05