The theory of mental models within a non-axiomatic logic

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.34024/prometeica.2026.33.21454

Keywords:

computer system, human reasoning, inference, Non-Axiomatic Logic, theory of mental models

Abstract

This paper tries to capture the theory of mental models from Non-Axiomatic Logic. The theory of mental models describes people’s natural inferential processes and has strong empirical support. Non-Axiomatic Logic allows building a computer system based on itself. So, if the theory of mental models is right, and Non-Axiomatic Logic can capture the theory, it is possible to build a computer system based on the latter logic coming to conclusions like those of the human natural inferential ability. I attempt to show that with several components of Non-Axiomatic Logic, this logic can represent the basic inferential processes the theory of mental models proposes.

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Author Biography

  • Miguel López-Astorga, University of Talca

    Miguel López Astorga has a Ph.D. in Logic and Philosophy of Science from the University of Cádiz (Spain). That degree is validated by the University of Chile. His undergraduate studies were also carried out in Spain. He has a bachelor's degree in philosophy and education sciences (Philosophy section) from the University of Seville. Likewise, he has a Teaching Degree for the High School Level in Philosophy from the University of Chile (this last degree was obtained by validation of the Spanish bachelor's degree). He carried out post-doctoral research on human reasoning, on the mental model theory, and on the logical forms of propositions, under the supervision of Professor Philip Johnson-Laird.

    At present, he is Full Professor and Researcher at the University of Talca (Chile). His last research focuses on both human and artificial inferential activities. He is especially interested in the relations that can be found between syntax, semantics, and pragmatics in those activities. He also addresses the possible cognitive potential of some ancient logics, particularly, Stoic logic.

References

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Published

2026-05-26

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Vol. 33 (2026): Prometeica - v 33 (01/2026- 12/2026)

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Copyright (c) 2026 Miguel López-Astorga

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Received 2025-11-14
Accepted 2026-04-29
Published 2026-05-26

How to Cite

López-Astorga, M. (2026). The theory of mental models within a non-axiomatic logic. Prometeica - Journal of Philosophy and Science, 33, e21454 (1-12). https://doi.org/10.34024/prometeica.2026.33.21454