La inteligencia artificial encarnada en la ciencia ficción

Presupuestos e implicaciones filosóficas



Palabras clave:

encarnación, conciencia, ciencia ficción, fenomenología, carne


En este artículo exploro la fructífera relación entre la ciencia ficción y la filosofía en relación con el tema de la inteligencia artificial. Establezco una conexión entre ciertos paradigmas de la filosofía de la mente y la conciencia y la imaginación de futuros escenarios posibles en la ciencia ficción, centrándome especialmente en las diferentes formas de concebir el papel de la corporeidad en la constitución de la conciencia y la cognición. Así, establezco un paralelismo entre estas diferentes concepciones de la corporeidad en la filosofía de la mente y ciertas representaciones de la IA en la ciencia ficción: desde los ordenadores hasta los robots y androides. Concluyo destacando el valor de un intercambio de ideas entre la ciencia ficción y la filosofía para prefigurar y evaluar algunos escenarios de gran relevancia ética.


Los datos de descargas todavía no están disponibles.


Bernet, R. (2013). The Body as a ‘Legitimate Naturalization of Consciousness.’ Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, 72, 43–65.

Bostrom, N. (2014). Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies. Oxford University Press.

Bourget, D., & Mendelovici, A. (2017). Phenomenal intentionality. In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, CSLI, Stanford University.

Bringsjord, S., & Govindarajulu, N. S. (2020). Artificial intelligence. In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philsophy. The Metaphysics Research Lab.

Brooks, R. A. (1991). Intelligence without representation. Artificial Intelligence, 47, 139–159.

Brooks, R. A. (2002). Flesh and Machines: How Robots Will Change Us. Pantheon Books.

Chalmers, D. J. (1996). The Conscious Mind. Oxford University Press.

Coleman, Sam (2015). Neuro-Cosmology. In P. Coates, S. Coleman (Eds.), Phenomenal Qualities: Sense, Perception, and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.

Coleman, Sam (2016). Panpsychism and Neutral Monism: How to Make up One’s Mind. In G. Bruntrup and L. Jaskolla, Panpsychism: Contemporary Perspectives. Oxford University Press.

Floridi, L., & Sanders, J. W. (2004). On the morality of artificial agents. In Minds and Machines, 14 (3), 349–379.

Geisslinger, M., Poszler, F., Betz, J., Lütge, C., & Lienkamp, M. (2021). Autonomous Driving Ethics: from Trolley Problem to Ethics of Risk. Philosophy and Technology, 34 (4), 1033-1055.

Gibson, J. J. (1962). Observations on Active Touch. Psychological Review, 69 (6), 477–491.

Haugeland, J. (1985). Artificial Intelligence: the Very Idea. MIT Press.

Horgan, T., & Tienson, J. (2002). The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality. In D. J. Chalmers (Ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings, 520–533. Oxford University Press.

Howard, D., & Muntean, I. (2017). Artificial Moral Cognition: Moral Functionalism and Autonomous Moral Agency. Philosophical Studies Series, 128, 121–159.

Husserl, E. (1962). Phänomenologische Psychologie: Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1925. Martinus Nihoff.

Husserl, E. (1983). Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. First Book: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology (F. Kersten, Ed.). Martinus Nihoff.

Husserl, E. (1989). Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. Second Book: Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitituion (R. Rojcewicz & A. Schuwer, Eds.). Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Husserl, E. (1991). On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917) (J. B. Brough, Ed.). Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Husserl, E. (2001a). Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis: Lectures on Transcendental Logic (A. J. Steinbock, Ed.). Springer.

Husserl, E. (2001b). Logical Investigations (J. N. Findlay & D. Moran, Eds.). Routledge.

Hutto, D. D., & Myin, E. (2012). Radicalizing Enactivism. Basic Minds Without Content. MIT Press.

Hutto, D. D., & Myin, E. (2017). Evolving Enactivism. Basic Minds Meet Content. MIT Press.

James, W. (1890). The Principles of Psychology. Dover.

Johnson, D. G., & Miller, K. W. (2008). Un-making artificial moral agents. Ethics and Information Technology, 10 (2–3), 123–133.

Kriegel, U. (2013). The Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program. In U. Kriegel (Ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality. Oxford University Press.

Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1980). Metaphors we Live By. University of Chicago Press.

Liberati, N. (2016). Technology, Phenomenology and the Everyday World: A Phenomenological Analysis on How Technologies Mould Our World. Human Studies, 39 (2), 189–216.

Liberati, N. (2020). The Borg–eye and the We–I. The production of a collective living body through wearable computers. AI and Society, 35 (1), 39–49.

Loar, B. (2003). Phenomenal Intentionality as the Basis of Mental Content. In M. Hahn & B. Ramberg (Eds.), Reflections and replies: Essays on the philosophy of Tyler Burge (pp. 229–258). MIT Press.

Merleau-Ponty, M. (1968). The Visible and the Invisible. Northwestern University Press.

Metzinger, T. (2021). Artificial Suffering: An Argument for a Global Moratorium on Synthetic Phenomenology. Journal of Artificial Intelligence and Consciousness, 8(1).

Mykhailov, D. (2020). The Phenomenological Roots of Technological Intentionality: A Postphenomenological Perspective. Frontiers of Philosophy in China, 15(4), 612–635.

Mykhailov, D. (2021). A moral analysis of intelligent decision-support systems in diagnostics through the lens of Luciano Floridi’s information ethics. Human Affairs, 31 (2), 149–164.

Mykhailov, D., & Liberati, N. (2022). A Study of Technological Intentionality in C++ and Generative Adversarial Model: Phenomenological and Postphenomenological Perspectives. Foundations of Science, 1–17.

Nagel, T. (1974). What is it Like to be a Bat. Philosophical Review, 83, 435–450.

Noë, A., & O’Regan, J. K. (2002). On the Brain-Basis of Visual Consciousness: a Sensorimotor Account. In A. Noë & E. Thompson (Eds.), Vision and Mind: Selected Readings in the Philosophy of Perception, 567–598. MIT Press.

O’Regan, J. K., & Noë, A. (2001). A Sensorimotor Account of Vision and Visual Consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 24, 939–1031.

Pace Giannotta, A. (2020). Qualitative relationism about subject and object of perception and experience. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 21, 583-602.

Pace Giannotta, A. (2021a), Panqualityism as a critical metaphysics for neurophenomenology. Constructivist Foundations, 16 (2), 163-166.

Pace Giannotta, A. (2021b), Autopoietic enactivism, phenomenology and the problem of naturalism: a neutral monist proposal. Husserl Studies, 37, 209-228.

Pace Giannotta, A. (2022a), The mind-body problem in phenomenology and its way of overcoming it. Vita Pensata, 26, 76-83.

Pace Giannotta, A. (2022b), Corpo funzionale e corpo senziente. La tesi forte del carattere incarnato della mente in fenomenologia. Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia, 13 (1), 51-70.

Putnam, H. (1981). Brains in a Vat. Reason, Truth, and History, 1–21.

Searle, J. (1980). Minds, Brains and Programs. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3 (3), 417–457.

Sullins, J. P. (2010). RoboWarfare: Can robots be more ethical than humans on the battlefield? Ethics and Information Technology, 12 (3), 263–275.

Thompson, E. (2005). Sensorimotor Subjectivity and the Enactive Approach to Experience. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 4, 407–427.

Turing, A. M. (1950). Computing machinery and intelligence. Mind, LIX, 433–460.

Varela, F. J. (1996). Neurophenomenology. A Methodological Remedy for the Hard Problem. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 3 (4), 330–349.

Varela, F. J. (1999). The Specious Present: A Neurophenomenology of Time Consciousness. In J. Petitot, F. J. Varela, B. Pachoud, & J.-M. Roy (Eds.), Naturalizing Phenomenology: Issues in Contemporary Phenomenology and Cognitive Science, 266–314. Stanford University Press.

Varela, F. J., Thompson, E., & Rosch, E. (1991). The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience. MIT Press.

Verbeek, P. P. (2008). Cyborg intentionality: Rethinking the phenomenology of human-technology relations. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 7 (3), 387–395.

Wellner, Galit (2014), The quasi-face of the cell phone: Rethinking alterity and screens. Human Studies 37 (3), pp. 299-316.

Wellner, Galit (2020), Postphenomenology of augmented reality. In H. Witse (Ed.), Relating to Things: Design, Technology and the Artificial. Bloomsbury.

Zahavi, D. (2002). Merleau-Ponty on Husserl: a Reappraisal. In T. Toadvine & L. Embree (Eds.), Merleau-Ponty’s Reading of Husserl. Kluwer.

Zahavi, D. (2003). Inner Time-Consciousness and Pre-Reflective Self-Awareness. In D. Welton (Ed.), The New Husserl: a Critical Reader, 157–180. Indiana University Press.

Zahavi, D. (2010). Inner (Time-)Consciousness. In D. Lohmar & I. Yamaguchi (Eds.), On Time - New Contributions to the Husserlian Phenomenology of Time, 319–339. Springer Netherlands.



Cómo citar

Pace Giannotta, A. (2022). La inteligencia artificial encarnada en la ciencia ficción: Presupuestos e implicaciones filosóficas. Prometeica - Revista De Filosofía Y Ciencias, (Especial), 21–35.
Recebió: 2022-03-27
Aceptado: 2022-07-20
Publicado: 2022-08-11

Artículos similares

También puede {advancedSearchLink} para este artículo.