Revisitando críticamente nociones de similitud en la teoría de juegos comportamentales

Autores/as

  • Carlos Maximiliano Senci Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales del Sur (IIESS) - Universidad Nacional del Sur - CONICET https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9131-3843

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.34024/prometeica.2021.23.11319

Palabras clave:

teoría de juegos. similitud. superracionalidad. razonamiento en equipo. pensamiento mágico.

Resumen

El objetivo de este trabajo consiste en revisar críticamente diferentes concepciones de similitud en la teoría de juegos que se encuentran presupuestas en diversos conceptos de solución. Pasamos revista a cuatro concepciones: 1) similitud empírica, 2) la doctrina Harsanyi-Aumann, 3) Superracionalidad, y 4) pensamiento mágico. Evaluamos críticamente las diferentes nociones en función de la similitud que presuponen, la viabilidad para resolver problemas de coordinación y/o cooperación basados en ellas, y su fundamentación racional.

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Publicado

2021-08-22

Cómo citar

Senci, C. M. (2021). Revisitando críticamente nociones de similitud en la teoría de juegos comportamentales: . Prometeica - Revista De Filosofía Y Ciencias, (23), 92–107. https://doi.org/10.34024/prometeica.2021.23.11319
Recibido 2020-10-22
Aceptado 2021-07-12
Publicado 2021-08-22