Undetermination of theories by evidence

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.34024/prometeica.2026.33.21971

Keywords:

underdetermination, evidence, philosophy of science, Duhem, Quine.

Abstract

The precise formulation of the problem of underdetermination of theories by evidence in the philosophy of science is certainly novel. However, we can trace its origins to other major philosophical issues, such as skepticism or the problem of induction. This article seeks to explore the factors that have influenced the emergence and characterization of the notion of underdetermination, as well as certain issues concerning the nature and aims of science associated with it. To this end, the theoretical debate involving classical thinkers such as Duhem and Quine, along with contemporary voices such as Laudan and Stanford, among others, has been examined.

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Author Biography

  • Violeta Conde Borrego, University of Salamanca

    Violeta Conde es doctora en Lógica y Filosofía de la Ciencia y profesora sustituta de Lógica y Filosofía de la Ciencia en la Universidad de Salamanca. Su investigación se inscribe en la tradición de la filosofía analítica y se centra principalmente en la metafísica y la epistemología de la modalidad, así como en sus conexiones con la lógica formal y la noción de estructura fundamental del mundo.

    Se graduó en Filosofía por la Universidad Complutense de Madrid, donde desarrolló un temprano interés por la metafísica y la lógica. Posteriormente cursó el Máster en Lógica y Filosofía de la Ciencia en la Universidad de Salamanca, en el itinerario de Lógica, recibiendo una sólida formación en lógica modal, metalógica, teoría de conjuntos y filosofía de la lógica. Obtuvo el doctorado en la Universidade de Santiago de Compostela gracias a una beca FPU del Ministerio de Universidades, bajo la codirección de Concha Martínez Vidal y Javier Cumpa, y como miembro del grupo de investigación EPISTEME.

    Su tesis doctoral, distinguida con la calificación de cum laude, aborda cuestiones centrales de la metafísica y la epistemología de la modalidad a partir del marco del necesitismo, especialmente en la formulación defendida por Timothy Williamson. En ella analiza críticamente problemas como la cuantificación irrestricta, la proliferación ontológica y el estatuto de los objetos contingentemente no concretos, proponiendo estrategias para hacer el necesitismo más intuitivo.

    Ha realizado estancias de investigación en la Freie Universität Berlin y en la Universidad de Oxford, y ha publicado trabajos en revistas internacionales de prestigio como Teorema, Metaphysica y Daimon. Su labor académica se complementa con experiencia docente en lógica y filosofía teórica, así como con una activa participación en proyectos de investigación y en la organización de eventos científicos internacionales.

References

Duhem, P. (1954). The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory. Trans. From 2nd Ed. By P.W. Wiener; originally published as La Théorie Physique: Son Objet et sa Structure (Paris: Marcel Riviera & Cie., 1914). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/9780691233857

Earman, J. (1993). “Underdetermination, Realism, and Reason”. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 18: 19 – 38. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4975.1993.tb00255.x

Laudan, L. (1981). “A Confutation of Convergent Realism”. Philosophy of Science, 48: 19 – 48. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1086/288975

Laudan, L. and Leplin, J. (1991). “Empirical Equivalence and Underdetermination”.Journal of Philosophy, 88: 449 – 472. DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/2026601

Moulines, U. (1986). “The Ways of Holism”. Noûs, 20(3): 313 – 330. DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/2215300

Quine, W.V.O. (1961). “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”. Reprinted in From a Logical Point of View. 2nd Ed. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, pp. 20-46.

Quine, W.V.O. (1975). “On Empirically Equivalent Systems of the World”. Erkenntnis, 9 (3): 313 – 328. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00178004

Quine, W.V.O. (1991). “Two Dogmas in Retrospect”. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 21 (3): 265 – 274. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1991.10717246

Sklar, L. (1981). “Do Unborn Hypotheses Have Rights?”. Pacific Philosophical Quaterly, 62: 17 – 29. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0114.1981.tb00039.x

Stanford, P. K. (2001). “Refusing the Devil’s Bargain: What kind of Underdetermination Should We Take Seriously?”. Philosophy of Science, 68: S1 – S12. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1086/392893

Stanford, P. K. (2017). “Underdetermination of Scientific Theory”. En Zalta, E. N. (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Invierno 2017 Ed.). Recuperado de https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-underdetermination/

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Published

2026-06-09

Issue

Vol. 33 (2026): Prometeica - v 33 (01/2026- 12/2026)

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Articles

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Copyright (c) 2026 Violeta Conde Borrego

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Received 2026-02-27
Accepted 2026-05-13
Published 2026-06-09

How to Cite

Conde Borrego, V. (2026). Undetermination of theories by evidence. Prometeica - Journal of Philosophy and Science, 33, e21971 (1-10). https://doi.org/10.34024/prometeica.2026.33.21971