History as the Autonomous Science of Human Affairs

Collingwood and experience as historical experience

Abstract

This work aims to elucidate the original notion of experience present in Collingwood´s philosophy of history. It presents how experience is the main implicit operating element behind the two concepts that undermine the realist epistemological doctrine. Knowing makes no difference to what is known: the logic of question and answer and the theory of absolute presuppositions. First of all, it will be explained how both concepts emerge from the author´s historical practice as an alternative to entrenched, obsolete pseudo-historical practices such as the scissors and paste history and critical history. Furthermore, Quine and Davidson´s critique of the two dogmas of empiricism will prove helpful for showing the convergence between these two authors and Collingwood´s quarrel with realism and comparing the two concepts as mentioned earlier and the logic of investigation as proposed by the two other authors. This approach will show a Collingwoodian concept of experience capable of withstanding possible idealist or relativistic labels and effectively explain a truly authentic scientific historical practice, open to cooperation between the different forms of knowledge or modes of experience.