The kantian notion of freedom and autonomy of artificial agency

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.34024/prometeica.2021.23.10811

Keywords:

transcendentalism. phenomenal consciousness. artificial agency. naturalized rationality and autonomy.

Abstract

The objective of this paper is to provide critical analysis of the Kantian notion of freedom (especially the problem of the third antinomy and its resolution in the critique of pure reason); its significance in the contemporary debate on free-will and determinism, and the possibility of autonomy of artificial agency in the Kantian paradigm of autonomy. Kant's resolution of the third antinomy by positing the ground in the noumenal self resolves the problem of antinomies; however, it invites an explanatory gap between phenomenality and the noumenal self; even if he has successfully established the compatibility of natural causality and non-natural causality through his transcendental argument. This paper is also devoted to establishing the plausibility of the knowledge claim that Kantian reduction of phenomenality has served half of the purpose of the AI scientists on the possibility of Artificial Autonomous Agency.

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Published

2021-08-22

Issue

No. 23 (2021): Prometeica - nº 23 (08/2021 - 01/2022)

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Articles

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How to Cite

Sahu, M. (2021). The kantian notion of freedom and autonomy of artificial agency . Prometeica - Journal of Philosophy and Science, 23, 136-149. https://doi.org/10.34024/prometeica.2021.23.10811