Artículos
https://doi.org/10.34024/prometeica.2023.26.14289
TWO DOMINANT SECURITY CONCEPTS IN EUROPE AND ITS INFLUENCE ON UKRAINE
DOS CONCEPTOS DE SEGURIDAD DOMINANTES EN EUROPA Y SU INFLUENCIA EN UCRANIA
DOIS CONCEITOS DOMINANTES DE SEGURANÇA NA EUROPA E SUA INFLUÊNCIA SOBRE A UCRÂNIA
(Department of Jurisprudence - Severodonetsk Institute PJSC “Higher Education Institution “Interregional Academy of Personnel Management”
93400, 24A Smetanina Str., Severodonetsk, Ukraine)
(Department of Theory of State and Law and Constitutional Law Higher Education Institution “Interregional Academy of Personnel Management”
03039, 2 Frometovskaya Str., Kyiv, Ukraine)
(Educational-Scientific Institute of Law named after Volodymyr the Great
Interregional Academy of Personnel Management 03039, 2 Frometovskaya Str., Kyiv, Ukraine)
(Department of Law Enforcement and Anti-Corruption Activities Higher Education Institution “Interregional Academy of Personnel Management”
03039, 2 Frometovskaya Str., Kyiv, Ukraine)
Interregional Academy of Personnel Management 03039, 2 Frometovskaya Str., Kyiv, Ukraine)
arifkhodzhaieva8229@sci-univ.com
Recibido: 01/09/2022
Aprobado: 03/01/2023
ABSTRACT
The article is devoted to the analysis of two dominant security concepts in the modern world. Given the long bipolarity of the world, due to the dominance of the Horde and Westphalian concepts of security, the question arises about the place of Ukraine in this coordinate system. In the process of research, a historical analysis of the emergence, formation and dissemination of two, alternative concepts of security, which are characteristic of countries with different governance models. The article argues that at present two concepts of state security are dominant in the world, namely the Westphalian and the Horde. The conducted analysis allows us to state that the strategic partnership between these two concepts of security is illusory, given the great differences in the principles of concept construction.
Keywords: international security. statehood. influence. geopolitical situation. historical analysis.
RESUMEN
El artículo está dedicado al análisis de dos conceptos de seguridad dominantes en el mundo moderno. Dada la larga bipolaridad del mundo, debido al dominio de la Horda y los conceptos de seguridad de Westfalia, surge la pregunta sobre el lugar de Ucrania en este sistema de coordenadas. En el proceso de investigación, se realiza un análisis histórico del surgimiento, formación y difusión de dos conceptos alternativos de seguridad, característicos de países con diferentes modelos de gobernanza. El artículo argumenta que en la actualidad dos conceptos de seguridad estatal son dominantes en el mundo, a saber, el de Westfalia y el de la Horda. El análisis realizado permite afirmar que la asociación estratégica entre estos dos conceptos de seguridad es ilusoria, dadas las grandes diferencias en los principios de construcción del concepto.
Palabras clave: seguridad internacional. categoría de estado. influencia. situación geopolítica. análisis histórico.
RESUMO
O artigo é dedicado à análise de dois conceitos de segurança dominantes no mundo moderno. Dada a longa bipolaridade do mundo, devido ao domínio dos conceitos de segurança da Horda e Vestfália, surge a questão sobre o lugar da Ucrânia nesse sistema de coordenadas. No processo de pesquisa, uma análise histórica do surgimento, formação e disseminação de dois conceitos alternativos de segurança, característicos de países com diferentes modelos de governança. O artigo argumenta que, atualmente, dois conceitos de segurança do Estado são dominantes no mundo, a saber, a Vestefália e a Horda. A análise realizada permite afirmar que a parceria estratégica entre esses dois conceitos de segurança é ilusória, dadas as grandes diferenças nos princípios de construção do conceito.
Palavras-chave: segurança internacional. estado. influência. situação geopolítica. análise histórica.
The development of public policy around the world and in Ukraine is in constant dynamics. In terms of historical events, we see a gradual transition from the industrial to the information age. However, the bipolarity of our world remains independent of changes in human thoughts regarding the processes of development of society. This statement also applies to the concepts of public security administration, which are generally divided into two different views that compete with each other. One concept is that the security system should be based on the cooperation of its members with the established powers and
rights of each party. The second concept is based on a broader individuality in the management of each of its members and the presence of some competition between them (Potіkha, 2011).
These management concepts have been used in different settings and at different times, from world wars to the current COVID-19 pandemic. Each of these concepts has weaknesses and strengths and shows its effectiveness in different cases without losing its relevance. States that use one or another concept of public administration often have common borders, and hence opposing views in solving the same problems in defending their interests in the political arena (Bofill, 2021). This is exactly the situation in which the state of Ukraine found itself. The situation did not improve even with the recognition of independence and the adoption of the Constitution of Ukraine (Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 1996), which consolidated the sovereignty of the state.
In order to answer a number of questions such as the nature of permanent bipolarity, why throughout history these two worlds have failed to reconcile, what is the fate of the world and its security in the future and what role is assigned to Ukraine in this matter, we must analyze the two concepts of world security, namely Westphalia and Horde, and identify key features of the difference between one and the other. The properties of management and the distribution of power in society are the basic features of the approach to the concept of security. The nature of power and management is based on the recognition of parental and family power. Scientists of antiquity and to the middle of the XIX century in their works wrote that family society is a certain basis for the development of society as a whole. "The family is a natural society", wrote Aristotle (2020). "The oldest of all societies and the only natural one is the family"- said J.-J. Rousseau (2018): "society was first a family and then a state".
The emergence of different views on the form of government and administration began in antiquity and later created a plurality of opinions about the form of government and society. These views at that time had not yet taken the form of concepts, but formed the basis of these two concepts. As already mentioned, the source of these concepts has common roots in the very nature of power. Analyzing the historical component of the question, we can conclude that the concept of leader or monarch in history is reflected in current ideas about the leader. Leader, in fact, is a priest who performs public rites, consolidates national forces and opinions. And the monarch is a military leader who, if necessary, leads the campaigns, directs social forces to maintain security. At the request of the leader, a council convenes, but he is only a man among men. Instead, the role of a religious leader, a priest, is inextricably linked to numerous limitations and self-limitations. He is bound by numerous strict taboos, as an example he can be restricted in food, restrictions in information, restrictions in communication. The key historical moment is a kind of combination of these two regalia in one. After all, when a religious leader takes over the religious rank, he assigns the advantages of a magical position, characteristic of a priest, without accepting his sacred restrictions (De Jouvenel, 2011).
Like most countries in the world, the Ukrainian state was formed from proto-state formations from the Black Sea to the Belarusian forests, from the Don to the Carpathians, at one time or another in history. Today there are discussions about the time of the final delineation of territories into one Ukrainian state as an independent state, but in fact it occupied the geographical position it occupies today, throughout history. Historically, it is its geopolitical location that Ukraine can owe to its difficult political situation. After all, it is the geographical location between Europe with one concept for which Ukraine is a kind of protective buffer against the descendants of the Mongols on the one hand and the wild steppe with another concept for which it is a springboard for self-affirmation and a corridor to Europe. This may explain its numerous changes in Ukraine's priority in matters of fluctuation policy from one extreme to another. It is worth paying attention to other state formations that have historically surrounded Ukraine, constantly influencing its security. To the north and east is Russian land, to the south is Turkey with the Muslim world, and the western border is bordered by the European Union. This situation has been observed for more than a century, which has led to different political decisions of Ukraine in accordance with different situations of world situations.
Analyzing historical events, first of all, we should forget the ingrained but misconceptions that the current Russian state originates from Varangian, Byzantine and Kyiv (ie - Ukrainian) roots. Such views on the origin of the Ukrainian state, in our opinion, are completely wrong. This objection is most successfully revealed by the writer Hryhoriy Chkhartishvili (2012) in his work "History of the Russian state". He noted that Russia, as we know, was founded not in 862 by the invitation of the Vikings to rule, not in 988 by the baptism of Russia, not by Yaroslav the Wise and not by Vladimir Monomakh, who was the successor of the Constantinople Caesar. Hryhoriy Chkhartishvili (2012) refutes another common misconception that the ancient Kyivan state was destroyed by the Mongol-Tatar invasion and then rebuilt. Kievan Rus collapsed long before the invasion of Khan Batu in 1237. External aggression took place in the second half of the 11th century, when the Polovtsian hordes inflicted two heavy military defeats on Kyiv, first in 1067 and 1093. After these military defeats
, the former power of the state could not be restored. Finally, the Eastern European state was undermined by the decline of the trade route "from the Vikings to the Greeks", the development and maintenance of which, in fact, developed the original Ukrainian state. By the twelfth century, more convenient routes for Byzantine-European trade had emerged, and Byzantium itself had weakened and declined. Thus, the collapse of the Kyiv state was due to a number of external factors and internal contradictions.
Andrew Bogolyubsky, prince of the north-eastern lands in 1169 defeated the troops of Kievan Rus, as a result of which Kiev ceased to be the capital of a single state. At the time of the Mongol horde attack, the territory of the former Kievan Rus was already divided into small and medium-sized principalities. This situation has existed for two centuries. Later, on the lands of the current Ukrainian state, two different models of state development began to take shape: the Lithuanian monarchical-aristocratic and, in the middle of the 14th century, the Moscow one, which was subject to the Mongol Horde and very similar to its state system. The very origin of the Russian state is directly associated with Prince Ivan III of Moscow (1462-1505). Ivan III created the foundations that determined the architectural parameters of the future of the Russian state. Over the centuries and to this day, this basis has been preserved, although it has been somewhat transformed under the influence of various studies and historical events of that time (Chkhartishvili, 2012).
The basis for understanding the concepts of this security was the reign of Prince Ivan Vasilyevich, who, having received the throne in 1462, had to take care of the security of his state. At that time, the Russians had already lost their independence and did not have the science of state building and did not use the experience of Kievan Rus. So, Prince Ivan III began to borrow the technology of state building from neighbors. However, the geopolitical situation was tense. Future European states - France, England, Spain, Germany, Italy have just passed the period of historical unification and solved their internal problems. The once strong Polish-Lithuanian alliance, after the Grunwald victory (1410), weakened and experienced a severe crisis. And the Byzantine Empire perished under the pressure of Turkish Muslims.
Ivan III was well acquainted with the internal structure of the Horde, as Russia was part of the Tatar state for two hundred years. Moscow rulers had good relations with the Tatars, which allowed them to become more authoritative than other princes. They acted as administrators and overseers of the collection of Horde tribute. Taking advantage of their position, the Moscow rulers became rich by organizing the payment of tribute, even became richer and more powerful than the khans themselves, but out of habit, looked at them from the bottom up, dreaming of living like their masters, that is - in the Horde style.
It can be argued that the cultural and social policy of Ivan Vasilyevich was much closer to the Tatars than to the Europeans. At that time there was a fashion for everything Horde. For example, at the court of his father Vasily the Dark, the Moscow nobles dressed in Tatar, shaved their heads in Tatar, and the Tatar language was the language of secular communication, as in future times, French. The most loyal and respected assistants of the Grand Duke were the Tatar princes and Murzas, who went to serve in the Moscow court. Interestingly, the main regalia of the Russian autocracy, the Monomakh hat, had nothing
to do with the Byzantine emperor Monomakh, but was sent as a gift from the Horde, probably from Khan Uzbek to the faithful vassal Ivan Kalita.
So, what is the Horde model of security used by Ivan III? It should be noted for the future that this system successfully proved itself in the neighborhood of fragmented medieval Europe and the weak steppe, although later proved ineffective and archaic during the social, scientific, ideological, cultural, technical, industrial revolution that began with the Renaissance and then all gained more popularity, so that Russia constantly had to catch up with Europe.
Hryhoriy Chkhartishvili (2012) identifies eight main features of the concept of security, which the
Russian state took as a model, and which are similar in features to the Horde's form of government:
Rigid centralization as the basis of the Horde concept of security and governance. This means that all more or less important decisions - administrative, economic, cultural, political, ideological - are made at the center or must be authorized by it. On the positive side, it should be noted that this form of government simplifies and accelerates mobilization mechanisms, which are urgently needed to address certain threats such as wars, epidemics and catastrophic crop failures. On the downside, this is a slow administration. As a result, such centralization is effective in crisis situations, but does not manifest itself well in a normal environment.
The sacredness of the personality of the bearer of supreme power. The stability of the state is based on the inclination to higher power, which in turn provides a good policy and security. The usefulness of this form is less likely to be any kind of internal shock. However, there are serious risks in giving unlimited power to the ruler, seeing that he is a living person and can make mistakes in making decisions alone. Weakness of the ruler, such as his physical or mental condition, age can also lead to a catastrophe in the country.
The will of the ruler is higher than the law. Having their own laws proclaiming the rule of law, the citizens of such a state are, in fact, obliged to submit to the decision of the ruler. Following the example of the Horde, which knew and respected the law of the Great Iasi, but was governed not by its rules, and Khan's decrees. Today, such a model is the state of the Russian judicial system, which makes any decisions of Putin's government, and this, as we see, is not an innovation. On the contrary, it is a return to the sixteenth century, when the courts were guided not by the letter of the law but by the will of the king.
The militarization of the Horde state. The peculiarity of this concept is manifested both in the indispensable power of the Armed Forces and the predominance of military expenditures over all other budget items, and in the relevant principle of civilian administration. A characteristic feature is that orders are not discussed, but executed, collective resolution of issues is absent or poorly developed. The administrative apparatus is accountable exclusively to the authorities, and the ruler is not accountable to anyone and is inaccessible to any criticism.
The state is the highest value in this concept of security. This means that it is not the state that protects the interests of the people, but the people that protect the interests of the state. The concept of Horde security is built in such a way that the personal lack of freedom and lawlessness of its inhabitants is an important condition, otherwise it simply would not be able to function. According to the commandments of the great Khan Genghis Khan, all residents of the state are considered in the civil service.
The system of personal privileges surpasses the system of personal rights. The difference between rights and privileges is based on the fact that rights are natural and inalienable, they can be lost only by a court decision. Privileges are granted by the authorities and can be taken away by them. The proximity of the user of such privileges to the power pyramid affects their volume and quality. This principle affects better manageability in the structure of the Horde concept of security, because the official knows that his well-being depends entirely on the will of the ruler.
Special importance is given to the secret police. This structure is directly subordinate to the ruler and must control and often duplicate the activities of the entire power vertical. In the absence or nominal presence of public control over the work of all levels of the state apparatus, the authorities have the opportunity to obtain verified information about events in the country and prevent all sorts of dissatisfaction. Genghis Khan relied on the "black fog": a group of guards, who were endowed with
special powers, in solving special assignments. A study of Russia's history shows that its rulers constantly created similar structures to help them keep the country under control. Such structures include the Oprichny Corps of Ivan the Terrible, the spy department of Semyon Godunov - the "right ear" of Boris, the Transfiguration Order of Peter the Great, the Secret Chancellery, the Security Department, the NKVD, the KGB and so on until the current FSB.
Finally, such a concept of security does not exist without a higher purpose. This means that the sacredness of power, which is based on non-freedom and coercion, must be justified by an even greater task, for which the people are obliged to accept all suffering. The ideological direction of state development should be aimed at supporting such a supreme goal. For example, Genghis Khan had the goal of creating a global, ocean-to-ocean, empire, which would be guided by a single will, while it had to be harmonious, fair and safe for the people. In monarchical Russia, there was an ideal of the "Third Rome" - like a kind of world empire, under the wing of Orthodoxy and ruled by the Russian tsar. Another example is Bolshevism, which was built under the slogan "Paradise on Earth". Today we see a situation with a contrived idea of global protection of Russian citizens from everyone in the world and under this pretext an attempt to revive the Soviet Union, for which Russian passports are issued en masse and hybrid military conflicts are used (Weatherford, 2018).
The first of the eight foundations of Horde's concept of security is certainly the first: total centralization. In the Horde Empire, the idea of centralization of power was introduced into the absolute. All decisions taken went down the vertical of power and did not provide for their discussion, change, or refusal to implement (Weatherford, 2018). The successful adaptation of such a concept was preceded by the conditions that existed in the world at that time. Such a world could be equated with the desert and its harsh climate or taiga, in which evil people lived, and the principle of rigid subordination worked well. In those days, the most typical solution to interstate conflicts was resolved by force of arms. Therefore, the Horde state with its concept of security was almost always stronger than the states arranged in a softer way. Thus, in the nineteenth century, it defeated the empire of Napoleon Bonaparte, which was the most powerful in Europe.
The Horde concept has been used for many centuries by the Russian Empire. Countries that have adhered to this concept of security, such as China, Russia, and India, are located in an area that covers almost every culture on the planet (Lytvyn et al., 2022; Horobets et al., 2021). In the future, we will pay attention to the event, to understand the difference between the principles of the opposite concept of security, which was created in rich and attractive lands with a comfortable climate among society, which valued the privileges granted to them.
The Thirty Years' War of 1618-1648 was the culmination of numerous religious and political conflicts that took place in Central Europe. In this chaos and anarchy, all possible contradictions between the main settlements were mixed. During that difficult period, Central Europe lost almost a quarter of its population due to war, disease and famine. To resolve the situation, exhausted opponents met in a region called Westphalia, to reach an agreement that contained a number of measures to stop the bloodshed. It was then that the concept of security was outlined, which consisted of the introduction of various political units, none of which had the power to defeat all others. The participants in this process sought to achieve and agree on neutral rules governing behavior and mitigating conflicts. Henry Kissinger emphasized that the Treaty of Westphalia should be seen as a practical approximation to reality. The author called this concept Westphalian. This concept also has a number of principles:
The principle of general balance of power, namely the recognition of only the coexistence of independent states. Such states should refrain from interfering in each other's internal affairs.
Autonomy of states on their territory. A parity approach to resolving the geopolitical external issues of the states parties to such an agreement without recognizing the advantages of any of the states.
Recognition of rights and freedoms, religious preferences of neighboring states and non-interference in the internal affairs of states.
The existence of a balance and a system of checks and balances, which was expressed in the presence of ambitions of the leaders of such states, acting as a counterweight to each other, limiting the scale of conflicts. This approach has led to a reduction in the pan-European confrontation and contributed to the formation of a prototype of the current Westphalian concept of security, based on diversity and containment (Diamond, 2012).
Analyzing the space between Europe and China, we can note the broader influence of the Horde's concepts of security, one of which was proposed by Islam, professing the dream of one-man rule, as commanded by Allah. Having studied the nature and peculiarity of two different concepts of security, we wonder why, with the influence of time, one of these two dissimilar concepts did not win? It is possible to assume that the answer is hidden in the habitat, natural phenomena and human factors. An example is the influence of the plague, which in the Middle Ages not only isolated Europe, but also cut off the Tatars from Persia and Russia, leaving them with China and India (Kissinger, 2015).
Analyzing historical events, we conclude that European empires maintained and developed their domination, to a greater extent, using a more sophisticated military structure and cultural heritage (Holovkin et al., 2021; Lytvyn et al., 2021). China, using the Horde's security model, on the other hand, emphasized the efficiency of the bureaucracy, managing and strengthening the empire, due to a highly developed sense of cultural superiority. The British, like the Spaniards, the Dutch and the French, focused on trade with other countries and maintaining friendly relations with neighbors. Security in such states was maintained by a perfect military structure and cultural self-affirmation (Bzhezynskyy, 2018). Thus, Europe has embarked on a gradual training to see its own multipolarity, seeing this as a guarantee of achieving a balance of power. Russia and China adopted the practice of steppe geopolitics, which was based on the presence of nomadic hordes, which competed for resources with rarely fixed territorial boundaries. Thus, the Westphalian concept of security is based on the balance of power of European friendly states in combination with the restriction of violence. The Horde's concept of security is based on the unlimited power of the monarch, and any attempt at such a restriction could lead to the catastrophe of such a state.
The Peace of Westphalia interpreted the international concept of security as a complex mechanism of checks and balances. Descendants of the Horde concept, such as Russia, sought to expand its borders at every stage of its life to the absolute maximum of material resources (Nash, 1950). The Westphalian Agreement was historically initiated by the states of Europe and later outlined in one of the elements of the concept of security of states from external forces. Today, the North Atlantic Alliance supports the basis for regular consultations between the United States and Europe and supports the use of a common security concept. As of today, the Westphalian concept of security has gone beyond the definition of purely European agreements. Initially, it was a mechanism in the deterrence system of the USSR around the world, ensuring this influence by the presence of the nuclear potential of the United States. Subsequently, it was used as a counterweight to the development of Muslim countries, which used their version of the Horde security concept.
After the crisis that followed the two devastating wars, Western European countries faced the problem of losing their historical identity due to a change in geopolitical position. Each state pays special attention to the protection of its identity and the rights of its citizens (Holovatyi, 2015). The traditional Westphalian concept of security was based on the principle of equality of all participants in such a process. To the best of their ability, each state sacrificed a portion of its power to achieve peace and stability. One can cite the example of the United States, which had strong military power and high nuclear capabilities, worked closely on security issues with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, uniting Allied forces into a common structure (Gevehr et al., 2021).
The clearest difference between the two main concepts of security can be traced to the example of Asian countries, namely the Chinese Horde security system, which has the oldest tradition, the clearest wording and as far as possible from the Westphalian principles. The historical formation of present-day China has made the longest and most difficult journey in history, from ancient civilization to the classical empire, then to the communist regime and, finally, to the modern state. The arms race between the Soviet
bloc and NATO in the 1950s and 1990s are another illustrative example. For almost 50 years, the two major countries that ruled these blocs, the United States and the Soviet Union, used a wealth of resources to keep up with each other. A similar situation is manifested in modern Russia, which behaves in a similar way in opposition to the democratic Western world. Not trusting each other, they continue to produce weapons using their material resources (Cherniavskyi et al., 2019). It should be emphasized that having several possible options for overcoming the centuries-old conflict, the two world security concepts did not choose the most favorable ways for them to overcome misunderstandings.
At present, we can say that two concepts of state security are dominant in the world, namely the Westphalian and the Horde. The strategic partnership between the two security concepts is illusory, apologizing for the large differences in the principles of concept building. Russia, as a representative of the Horde's concept of security, is now too backward and too devastated as a result of communist rule, which makes it a viable equal partner of the United States. Currently, the only threat to geopolitical equilibrium in the world, there is China and the high risk of Russia using its nuclear capabilities despite its human resources. The fundamental difference between the two main concepts of security is the reason for their constant competition. The Westphalian concept aims to protect its own citizens and to strengthen external security. The main idea of this approach is the desire of the state to show its strength so that external enemies are afraid to attack it. Horde's concept of security, directed inside the state. Its goal is to create and maintain tension and achieve a common belief within the country that there is an "external enemy" that threatens the sovereignty of the state, allowing it to quickly mobilize its forces. In addition, due to the fear and tension of their own population, it is easier to protect and secure the territories that remain "behind the Iron Curtain". Ukraine must use its unique geopolitical position to define and build its own concept of security, taking into account its previous, mostly negative experience in relations with its neighbors.
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